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I. 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court by virtue of 
plaintiff having appealed from the District Court of Utah to 
the Supreme Court of Utah pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-2(j) (1953, 
as amended 1989). The Supreme Court referred this case to the 
Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953, as 
amended 1990) . 
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II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in interpreting the language 
of the parties' contract such that defendant was not 
personally obligated to pay plaintiff the sums due and owing 
thereunder? 
2* Did the trial court commit reversible error in not 
determining a genuine issue of material fact was raised by the 
Affidavits filed by defendant, plaintiff and Rene Taylor? 
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error in 
denying plaintiff's Motion to Amend his Complaint on the basis 
that the Court had granted defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment by Minute Entry, despite the fact that the unopposed 
Motion to Amend was filed prior to the trial court's Minute 
Entry? 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The following Constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances and/or rules are applicable to the case on appeal 
and each of the following are set forth verbatim in the 
Addendum submitted herewith: 
1. Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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2. Rule 56(a) & (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to collect unpaid sums alleged to be 
due and owing by defendant pursuant to a written promissory 
note. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on August 28, 1989. 
(R.0001) Defendant's counsel served a Motion a Dismiss on 
September 15, 1989, but did not file the same with the court. 
The trial court denied defendant's Motion and awarded 
plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees of $250.00 on October 26, 
1989. (R.0020) On November 9, 19 89, the trial court entered 
an order denying defendant's Motion, ordering defendant to 
answer plaintiff's Complaint within ten (10) days of entry of 
the order and awarding plaintiff fees as set forth above. 
(R.0021-23) 
Defendant failed to answer the Complaint and a Default 
Certificate was entered on November 29, 1989. (R.0024-25) 
Defendant filed his Answer on November 31, 1989. (R.0026) On 
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December 1, 1989, plaintiff filed his Notice of Intent to File 
Default Judgment. (R.0028) On December 13, 1989, defendant 
filed a Motion and Memorandum to Set Aside Default 
Certificate. (R.0036) Plaintiff filed a response to 
defendant's Motion with an Affidavit of counsel on December 
18, 1989. (R.0040-53) The Court granted defendant's Motion 
by order dated January 19, 1990. (R.0059) 
Plaintiff served discovery requests upon defendant on 
January 26, 1990. (R.0061) On March 7, 1990, plaintiff filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment, with accompanying Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities, based upon defendant's responses to 
the foregoing discovery requests. (R.0069-0145) On March 19, 
19 90, defendant filed a cross Motion for Summary Judgment with 
accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities. (R. 0146-
0153) Defendant also filed an Affidavit in Opposition to 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.0154-0156) On 
March 22, 1990, plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike defendant's 
Affidavit with an accompanying Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities. (R. 0157-0164) On March 29, 1990, plaintiff 
filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, together with 
Affidavits of Plaintiff and Rene Taylor, concerning the 
preparation and intent of plaintiff regarding the promissory 
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note. (R.0175-0185) Plaintiff also served a Motion to Amend 
(R.0195) concurrent with the responsive pleadings to 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, but the same was not 
filed (due to lack of filing fee) until April 3, 1990. 
(R.0188) Plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint, that was 
filed with the Motion, asserted a Second Cause of Action 
against defendant based upon piercing the corporate veil. 
Defendant did not oppose plaintiff's Motion to Amend. 
The Motions for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike the 
Affidavit of Defendant Bagley were submitted for decision 
pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. On April 10, 1990, the Court, in an unsigned 
Minute Entry, granted plaintiff's Motion to Strike defendant's 
Affidavit to the extent the same related to defendant's 
understanding or intent; denied plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment; and granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(R.0206) 
On April 16, 1990, plaintiff filed a Notice to Submit for 
Decision regarding plaintiff's Motion to Amend. (R.0207) On 
April 18, 1990, the trial court denied plaintiff's Motion to 
Amend in an unsigned Minute Entry for the reason that the 
Court had previously granted defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on April 10, 1990. (R.0209) The Order granting 
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defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was entered on April 
23f 1990. (R.Q21Q-211) The Order denying plaintiff's Motion 
to Amend was entered on May 9, 1990 (R.0212-213) Plaintiff 
filed his Notice of Appeal on May 23, 1990. (R.0214-215) 
Co STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involved interpretation of the following 
promissory note that is set out, in toto, as follows: 
"Forty-five (45) days after date, for value 
received, I/we jointly and severally, promise to pay 
to Rene Taylor, agent for Lorenzo Jones Taylor or 
order Fifty-eight Thousand Dollars with interest 
payable Dec. 20, 1984 at the rate of 14% per annum 
from No.v(sic) 6, 1984 until paid. The holder shall 
have the right to declare this note due for default 
in payment of interest. 
Oncor Sound, Inc. 
/s/Douglas E. Baqley 
President" 
A factual dispute exists between the parties as to their 
intent with respect to personal liability as well as the issue 
of who drafted the note. The Affidavits submitted by 
plaintiff (R.0175-180) assert defendant drafted the note while 
defendant's Affidavit (R.0154-155) asserts plaintiff's son, 
Rene Taylor, either drafted the note or had the same drafted 
by an attorney. 
6 
V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant drafted a promissory note in favor of plaintiff 
containing the following phrase: "I/we jointly and severally 
promise to pay to... Lorenzo Taylor Jones...." Plaintiff 
maintains that the foregoing contractual language can only be 
interpreted to impose personal liability on defendant inasmuch 
as only one signature is affixed to the note. Plaintiff 
maintains that the trial court ignored the foregoing 
contractual language by failing to impose personal liability 
upon defendant. As such, plaintiff maintains the lower court 
erred in that it effectively rewrote the parties' agreement 
so as to eliminate the joint and several language in the note. 
The trial court erred in granting defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment where the Affidavits submitted by plaintiff 
evidenced a clear intent to hold defendant personally liable 
and defendant admits a discussion concerning his personal 
liability on the note was had between himself and plaintiff's 
agent. As such, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
improperly granted inasmuch the contract in question was not 
an integrated contract and genuine issues of material fact 
existed, precluding summary judgment. 
Finally, the trial court erred in holding that 
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plaintiff's unopposed Motion to Amend was barred by the 
court's granting of defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
where no order had been entered as of the date the Motion to 
Amend was ruled upon. As such, the case was not dismissed 
and the court committed reversible error in so holding. 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BECAUSE THE CONTRACTUAL PHRASE "I/WE 
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, PROMISE TO PAY..." 
RENDERS DEFENDANT PERSONALLY LIABLE TO 
PLAINTIFF. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
An appellate court reviews summary judgments for 
correctness "without according deference to the trial court's 
legal conclusions", Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 
1989) (citing Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988)). 
Moreover, the interpretation of the parties' agreement is a 
question of law and the trial court's construction of the 
contract will be given no deference. Jones v. Hinkle, 611 
P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980). Finally, an agreement should be 
construed as a whole with all of the terms to "be given effect 
if it is reasonably practicable to do so". Id., (citations 
omitted). 
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It has been held that "use of the pronoun 'we' usually 
creates a joint obligation,•., " 17 Am, Jur. 2d 718, 
Contracts, Section 298, and "a promise in the plural is 
prima-facie joint." Fidelity Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bismarck 
Invest. Corp., 547 P.2d 212, 214 (Utah 1976) (citations 
omitted). Moreover, the obligee is not required to pursue all 
joint obligors because 
"...if judgment were taken against all who 
were jointly obligated, the judgment 
creditor could get satisfaction from any 
one of the debtors. The one who was 
compelled to pay the joint obligation 
would have his rights to have contribution 
against his joint obligors, and this would 
be true whether the judgment was against 
them or not." Ld. at 214. (Emphasis 
added). 
Finally, the effect of a joint and several obligation is 
that: 
"Parties having a 'joint and several' 
obligation are bound jointly as one party, 
and also severally as separate parties at 
the same time and a joint and several 
contract is a contract with each promisor 
and a joint contract with all." Morgan & 
Oswood Const. Co, Inc. v. U. S. Fidelity 
and Guaranty Co., 535 P.2d 170, 172 
(Montana 1975). 
In the case at bar, the defendant has admitted he freely 
and voluntarily signed an unambiguous contract that "I/we 
jointly and severally promise to pay to... Lorenzo Jones 
Taylor..." The foregoing language "must be followed by the 
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Court," Federal Deposit Ins. Corp, at 214, and leads to only 
one conclusion — the defendant is personally liable for 
payment of the Note as a joint and several obligor with Oncor 
Sound, Inc. 
The trial court apparently adopted defendant's argument, 
however, that the promissory note was executed solely in a 
corporate capacity. In so doing, the lower court had to 
simply ignore the joint and several language of the agreement 
because the trial court struck defendant's Affidavit to the 
extent defendant asserted his intent. By striking defendant's 
Affidavit, the trial court must have determined the note to be 
unambiguous and that the contract must be interpreted solely 
on the language contained therein. The lower court, however, 
interpreted the agreement without construing all of the terms 
of the agreement. See, Jones, supra. The trial court 
therefore committed reversible error by denying plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff respectfully requests 
this Court to reverse and remand this matter to the District 
Court for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff pursuant to 
his Motion for Summary Judgment. 
II. 
PLAINTIFF, ALTERNATIVELY, ASSERTS THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE 
TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT CANNOT BE 
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RECONCILED ON ITS FACE THEREBY RENDERING 
THE SAME AMBIGUOUS AND GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT EXIST PRECLUDING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
A trial court must not assess credibility or weigh 
evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment and M[a] 
single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of 
fact." Webster vs, Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). 
The Plaintiff submittted his own affidavit as well as 
that of his son, Rene Taylor, stating that the Defendant 
drafted the agreement and the intent of the agreement was to 
hold Defendant personally liable. Defendant acknowledged, at 
paragraph 6 of his affidavit (R.0155), that a discussion was 
had concerning his personal liability on the note but 
controverted the affidavits filed in behalf of Plaintiff by 
stating he did not agree to be personally bound. Rene 
Taylor's affidavit, at paragraph 3 (R.0176), denies the 
statments of Defendant and asserts Defendant was to be 
personally liable. 
Thus, a dispute existed as to the issue of personal 
liability and the affidavits of the parties must be construed 
to mean that the parties' agreement was not a fully integrated 
and complete agreement. As such, the trial court should have 
considered the parol evidence submitted by the parties. See, 
Union Bank vs. Swenson, 707 p.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). 
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Moreover, parol evidence is admissable to clarify a facial 
ambiguity in an agreement, id., and it is plainly evident that 
the trial judge failed to consider the affidavits submitted by 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff therefore submits that a genuine issue 
of material fact existed that should have precluded granting 
of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S UNOPPOSED MOTION TO AMEND. 
The lower court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Amend 
because the court had promulgated a minute entry granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment prior to ruling on 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend. The trial court apparently 
relied on the cases of Steiner vs. State, 495 P.2d 809 (Utah 
1972) and Nichols vs. State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976). The 
trial court's reliance on these decisions is misplaced and 
warrants reversal. 
Both Steiner and Nichols involved similar fact situations 
in which the plaintiff's case was dismissed, an order was 
formally entered thereon and the plaintiff then filed a motion 
to amend several months after entry of the order of dismissal. 
The facts at bar are significantly different, to-wit: the 
Motion to Amend was filed before any ruling on the merits had 
occurred and the ruling on the Motion to Amend was decided 
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before entry of any order dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint. 
Neither Steiner nor Nichols is analgous to the case at bar and 
do not constitute good precedent to support the trial judge's 
ruling. 
A case more closely on point is Lone Star Motor Import, 
Inc., vs. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69 (5th Circ. 1961). 
In Lone Star, plaintiff brought suit for breach of contract. 
The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and 
the lower court ruled from the bench by granting defendant's 
motion. Plaintiff filed a motion to amend after the ruling 
but before entry of the order granting defendant's motion to 
dismiss. The trial judge denied the motion to amend. The 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that denying 
the motion to amend would unduly prejudice the plaintiff 
without any comparable showing of prejudice to the defendant. 
Thus, the Fifth Circuit remanded with instructions to grant 
plaintiff leave to amend. 
In the case at bar, Defendant cannot show any prejudice 
because Defendant did not claim any prejudice. In fact, 
Defendant did not even respond to Plaintiff's Motion! 
Clearly, Plaintiff is being prejudiced by not being able to 
pursue legal theories available to him whereas Defendant 
suffers no prejudice. Moreover, the Lone Star decision is 
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factually analgous because an unsigned minute entry is not a 
final order under Utah law. See, Wisden vs. City of Salina, 
69 6 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1985)(unsigned minute entry granting 
summary judgment is not a final judgment). Plaintiff 
therefore urges this Court to adopt the Lone Star decision and 
apply it to the case at bar by reversing and remanding with 
instructions to grant Plaintiff leave to file his Amended 
Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff asserts the trial court erred in denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as well as denying 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests 
this matter be remanded for entry of judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff as prayed in his Motion for Summary Judgment or, 
alternatively, an order remanding this matter to the trial 
court with instructions to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his 
complaint as prayed in his Motion to Amend. 
Dated this / ? day of ^ L ^ ^ ^ c l , 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Phillip W. Dye] 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
k/mi/Taylor.bri/APPl 
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ADDENDUM 
$58.000.00 November 6, 1984 
Forty-five (45) days after date, for value received, I/we 
jointly and severally, promise to pay to Rene Taylor, agent 
for Lorenzo Jones Taylor or order Fifty-eight'/Thousand Dollars 
with interest payable Dec. 20, 1984 at the rate of 14% per 
annum from No.v 6, 1984 until paid. The holder shall have the 
right to declare this note due for default in payment of 
interest. 
Opcor Sound, Inc.
 f 
000CG 
APPLICABLE RULES OF PROCEDURE 
Rule 15. Amended and Supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a 
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is 
served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive 
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon 
the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 
days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his 
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the 
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so 
requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original 
pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended 
pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court 
otherwise orders. 
Rule 56. Summary Judgment 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a 
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from 
the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon 
all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to 
all or any part thereof. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four (4) copies of Brief 
of Appellant were served by mailing delivery, first-class, 
postage pre-paid, by depositing the same with the United 
States Postal Service, on the A / day of ~Sj*7^$-~ . 1990, 
to: 
LES F. ENGLAND, ESQ. 
SUTHERLAND & ENGLAND 
3760 South Highland Drive 
Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
DATED this 
•4- day of 1990. 
Phillip W. Dyer 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
k/mi/Taylor.cer/APPl 
1 
